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Abstract
A set of quantum protocols for online shopping is proposed and analyzed to establish that it is possible to perform secure
online shopping using different types of quantum resources. Specifically, a single photon based, a Bell state based and
two 3-qubit entangled state based quantum online shopping schemes are proposed. The Bell state based scheme, being a
completely orthogonal state based protocol, is fundamentally different from the earlier proposed schemes which were based
on conjugate coding. One of the 3-qubit entangled state based scheme is build on the principle of entanglement swapping
which enables us to accomplish the task without transmission of the message encoded qubits through the channel. Possible
ways of generalizing the entangled state based schemes proposed here to the schemes which use multiqubit entangled states is
also discussed. Further, all the proposed protocols are shown to be free from the limitations of the recently proposed protocol
of Huang et al. (Quantum Inf. Process. 14, 2211-2225, 2015) which allows the buyer (Alice) to change her order at a later
time (after initially placing the order and getting it authenticated by the controller). The proposed schemes are also compared
with the existing schemes using qubit efficiency.
1 Introduction
In today’s society e-commerce plays a crucial role. Especially, we often purchase things from online stores. Such a purchase
requires online transaction, and that requires security measures. So far our online transactions are secured by classical proto-
cols, but it is well established that the majority of the classical security measures are vulnerable and they will not remain useful
in a post-quantum world (once a scalable quantum computer is built) [1]. Thus, we need quantum protocols for e-commerce.
This is so because security of any classical cryptographic protocol is based on some assumptions on the computational power
of Eve. In contrast, quantum cryptographic protocols are unconditionally secure. This fact is known since the introduction
of first quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol in 1984 [2]. Since then several quantum protocols have been proposed for
various practical tasks that require security ( [2–18] and references therein). For example, a set of schemes for QKD [2–6],
direct secure quantum communication [7–15], and its controlled counterpart-controlled deterministic secure quantum com-
munication (CDSQC) [16, 17], have been proposed in the recent past (see [18] for a review). A recent addition to this long
list is quantum e-commerce [19–24]. Specifically, in 2014, a three-party quantum protocol for online shopping was proposed
by Chou et al. [23]. In this protocol, Alice is a buyer, Bob is a merchant (say a representative of Walmart, Big Bazaar or any
other departmental stores which sales goods through e-commerce corporation like eBay, Flipkart or Amazon) and Charlie is a
controller who may be considered as a representative of VISA orMaster card or a representative of an e-commerce corporation
like, eBay, Flipkart or Amazon. Chou et al.’s scheme allows Alice to buy a product from Bob in a secure manner. However,
in Chou et al.’s protocol Charlie can obtain the information encoded by Alice (i.e., which product she wishes to buy). This
limitation of Chou et al.’s protocol [23] was noted by Huang et al. [24], and in 2015, they proposed an improved protocol for
quantum online shopping which is free from the limitation of Chou et al.’s scheme. More recently, a semiquantum scheme
for quantum online shopping has also been proposed by us [25]. Prior to these relatively new protocols, a set of protocols
were introduced for quantum online shopping [19–22]. Specifically, e-payment systems were introduced using quantum group
signature [19], quantum blind and group signature [20], quantum proxy blind signature [21], etc., and they were critically an-
alyzed. For example, cryptanalysis of inter-bank e-payment protocol introduced in Ref. [21] was performed in [22]. Further,
schemes based on blind signature have also been designed using quantum teleportation [26, 27]. It may be noted that Chou et
al.’s quantum-communication-based protocol [23] and its improved version proposed by Huang et al. [24] are free from the
limitations of early protocols [19–22] of quantum online shopping. Thus, we would concentrate on the possible improvement
of Chou et al.’s protocol [23] and Huang et al.’s protocol [24]. Further, we aim to provide a large number of alternative paths
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that may be used to realize quantum online shopping. These alternatives would provide choices to the experimentalists in-
terested in implementing schemes of quantum online shopping, based on the quantum resources available with them and the
noise present in the channel.
In what follows, we will show that the above mentioned schemes of quantum online shopping [19–24] are essentially
modified schemes of CDSQC, thus, the protocols of CDSQC that are introduced in the recent papers of some of the present
authors [17, 25] can be modified suitably to develop quantum protocols for online shopping. Further, it will be shown that
in Huang et al.’s protocol the buyer (Alice) can change her order at a later time (after initially placing the order and getting
it authenticated by the controller). This undesirable feature can be removed by using our schemes of CDSQC-based online
shopping.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce the existing schemes of
quantum online shopping. Thereafter, in Section 3, we propose four new protocols for quantum e-commerce and a few other
alternatives to perform the task. Subsequently, in the same section, we also describe a set of other cryptographic tasks related
to e-commerce which can be realized by slightly modifying the protocols proposed here. We further discuss the security and
qubit efficiency of the proposed schemes in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Existing protocols for quantum online shopping
Before we briefly describe the existing protocols of quantum online shopping it will be apt to note a few background infor-
mation. To begin with let us note that the security of all the existing protocols of secure quantum communication has been
achieved in two alternative ways which may be referred to as BB84 subroutine and GV subroutine. Specifically, an additional
set of n qubits are prepared as verification qubits and inserted randomly in the set of n travel qubits. The verification qubits are
referred to as decoy qubits and they are used later to check whether any eavesdropping attempt has been made. The presence
of Eve could be inferred from the error rate computed on these verification qubits. The two alternative subroutines differ in
the types of decoy qubits used and the principle of security in each case. Specifically, in BB84 subroutine, the security comes
in a manner analogous to the BB84 QKD protocol [2]. Specifically, it comes from non-commutativity and nocloning theorem,
where the decoy qubits are prepared randomly in {|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉} basis. The sender and receiver compute the error
rates from the qubits prepared by the sender and measured by the receiver in the same basis as any eavesdropping attempt
would have led to mismatch. In fact, the attempt made by Eve to learn the inaccessible information would cause disturbance
in an incompatible observable [28], which is maximal for mutually unbiased bases [29].
In contrast, the sender uses n
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copies of a Bell state (or equivalently an adequate number of mutliqubit entangled state) and
inserts them randomly in the string of travel qubits in the GV subroutine. This causes geographical separation between the
entangled qubits (ensured here through application of permutation of particles (PoP)) and Eve is unaware of the particle pairs,
thus may tend to choose wrong particle pairs to perform Bell measurement leading to entanglement swapping. Thus, at the
receiver’s end when correct positions of the entangled states are available, he can detect the signatures of eavesdropping in the
form of entanglement swapping caused due to it [13, 30]. An appropriate use of PoP technique makes the measurement basis
unavailable to Eve and security comes from the orthogonal states only. The nameGV subroutine originates from an orthogonal
state based QKD scheme introduced by Goldenberg and Vaidman, where temporal separation between two localized wave-
packets (whose orthogonal superpositions were used to send 0 and 1) were used to achieve the security [5].
Interestingly, the set of all entangled state based protocols which use BB84 subroutine can be easily transformed to
corresponding completely orthogonal state based schemes by replacing the BB84 subroutine with GV subroutine (see [13,18]
for detail).
Also note that all the protocols described in this section and the next section assume that the buyer (Alice) and merchant
(Bob) are registered members of eBay (eBay is an e-commerce corporation, but it can be equivalently viewed as an online
portal or a bank, too), and eBay (Charlie) is capable to authenticate the identities of Alice and Bob while communicating with
them. Further, in all the protocols described below, Alice sends a classical informationM via quantum means to Bob. Here,
M is the shopping information of Alice which includes her customer id, items to be purchased (item numbers), quantity of
each item to be ordered, etc.
To begin with let us briefly describe Chou et al.’s protocol [23], which we refer here as CLZ protocol.
2.1 Chou, Lin, Zeng (CLZ) protocol
CLZ 1: Alice informs Charlie that she wants to purchase something online. After receiving this information, Charlie prepares
and sends her a sequence of 2n qubits that is randomly prepared in {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}. However, Charlie does not
disclose which qubit is prepared in which basis.
Out of these 2n qubits, n will be used as decoy/verification qubits which will be used for eavesdropping check.
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In the original CLZ protocol, Charlie used to send n + δ qubits, out of which δ were verification qubits, but for
unconditional security we need to check half of the received qubits 1. This is why we use δ = n in this paper.
CLZ 2: Alice randomly selects n of the 2n qubits received by her and in collaboration with Charlie applies BB84 subroutine
on those n qubits. If the computed error rate is found to be lesser than the tolerable limit they continue to the next step,
otherwise they restart the protocol.
After the eavesdropping check is performed using BB84 subroutine, the qubits used for the same are discarded, and
Alice is left with n qubits which she uses as message qubits in the next step.
CLZ 3: Alice encodes her shopping information (M) on the n qubits of her possession using following rule: to encode
0 (1) she does nothing (applies iY operator). Subsequently, she randomly inserts n decoy qubits prepared at random in
{|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} into the message encoded sequence and sends that to Bob.
The encoding operation here is the same as that used in LM05 protocol [8] of QSDC.
CLZ 4: After receiving an authenticated acknowledgment of the receipt of 2n qubits from Bob, Alice discloses the positions
of n decoy qubits, and Alice and Bob apply BB84 subroutine on the decoy qubits to check eavesdropping. If no
eavesdropping is found they go to the next step, otherwise they restart the protocol.
CLZ 5: Bob asks Charlie, for the initial states of the n message qubits available with him, and Charlie provides that infor-
mation. With the encoded qubits and their initial states, merchant Bob can now deduce the shopping information of the
customer.
2.2 Huang, Yang, Jia (HYJ) protocol
Huang et al. [24] showed that in CLZ 3, when Alice sends a message encoded sequence to Bob, Charlie can capture all the
qubits and replace them by a fake sequence of 2n qubits. Later, when in CLZ 4, Alice discloses the positions of decoy qubits,
Charlie discards them from the captured sequence and measures rest using the basis in which he had initially prepared the
qubits. Eavesdropping check will definitely reveal this, but by then Charlie will have all the information encoded by Alice
although this information was not intended for him. For instance, assume that a country wishes to buy some items for defense
(say, weapons) from a multinational company, which would prefer to keep the details of the deal secret as its policy, and the
buyer would not like to reveal this information (specifically, which items he is going to buy and the quantities of each item to
be purchased) to a third party helping in making the payments. This limitation of CLZ protocol was circumvented in the HYJ
protocol, which may be viewed as an improved version of the CLZ protocol. HYJ protocol may be described as follows:
HYJ 1: Same as CLZ 1.
HYJ 2: Same as CLZ 2.
HYJ 3: Same as in CLZ 3 with a difference that Alice also prepares a random key K , and instead of M she sends M ′ =
K ⊕M to Bob and keepsK secret.
HYJ 4: Same as CLZ 4.
HYJ 5(a): Alice announcesK , and Bob uses that to obtainM = K ⊕M ′.
HYJ 5(b): Same as CLZ 5.
As K is unknown to Charlie till eavesdropping is checked in HYJ 4, Charlie’s strategy of sending fake sequence of qubits
to Bob will not work here. Specifically, Charlie’s eavesdropping will be detected in HYJ 4, and K is announced in HYJ
5 if and only if no trace of eavesdropping is detected in HYJ 4. Thus, HYJ scheme is free from the limitation of the CLZ
protocol. However, there exists a limitation of HYJ protocol as we have already mentioned. AsK is not known to Bob, Alice
has freedom to change his order till HYJ 5(a) by disclosing a different key K ′. Let us explain this with a specific example.
Consider that if Alice wants to buy a TV she has to send M1 = 100101; and if she wants to buy a refrigerator then she has
to sendM2 = 111100. In HYJ 3, Alice uses K = 010010 as key to yieldM
′ = K ⊕M1 = 010010⊕ 100101 = 110111,
but at the time of disclosure of the key she changes her mind and announces K ′ = 001011 as her key. As a consequence,
Bob will decode the message as K ′ ⊕M ′ = 001011 ⊕ 110111 = 111100 = M2. It is possible to cease this freedom of
Alice to change order till the end. However, to do so we have to ensure that Alice is not able to change the key after HYJ 3.
It is possible if a copy of the key is already available with Bob. Thus, Alice and Bob need to implement a protocol of QKD,
1In Ref. [31], it is shown that a random test of half of the qubits provide an upper bound on the errors in the rest of the transmitted qubits.
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quantum key agreement, direct secure quantum communication first to create or distribute a key and subsequently use that key
for encryption. This would restrict Alice from changing her order at the last moment.
One may argue that this freedom to choose the merchandise for Alice cannot affect the task intended. However, suppose
that possibility of placing an order is allowed only for the goods available in the store. In that case, Alice may change her order
to buy anything that may be available later. Further, on numerous such occasions (as in online limited offer sale, which start
on a predecided time and the orders made before and after the start of the sale must be treated independently), this freedom of
Alice is not desired. In what follows, we describe a few new schemes for quantum online shopping which are free from the
above mentioned limitation of HYJ protocol.
3 New protocols for quantum online shopping
In this section, we report four different protocols for quantum online shopping. All of them are essentially modified schemes
for CDSQC.
3.1 Protocol 1: PoP based quantum online shopping using single photons
Firstly, we show a simple minded PoP based scheme which is equivalent to HYJ protocol. The protocol is described as follows
(remaining steps are the same as that in HYJ protocol).
PoP 3: Same as in CLZ 3 with a difference that Alice applies a permutation operator Πn on her message encoded sequence
before random insertion of the decoy qubits, but keeps the actual sequence secret.
PoP 5(a): Alice announcesΠn and Bob uses that to obtainM.
3.2 Protocol 2: Orthogonal state based quantum online shopping using Bell states
Our orthogonal state based quantum online shopping protocol can be described in following steps:
OSB 1: Charlie prepares n Bell states |ψ+〉⊗n with n ≥ 2, where |ψ±〉 = |00〉±|11〉√
2
and |φ±〉 = |01〉±|10〉√
2
. He prepares two
ordered sequences from the Bell states as follows:
1. A sequence of all the first qubits of the Bell states: PA = [p1 (tA) , p2 (tA) , ..., pn (tA)],
2. A sequence of all the second qubits of the Bell states: PB = [p1(tB), p2(tB), ..., pn(tB)],
where the subscripts 1, 2, · · · , n denote the order of a particle pair pi = {tiA, tiB}, which is in the Bell state.
OSB 2: Charlie applies an n-qubit permutation operator Πn on PB to create a new sequence as P
′
B = ΠnPB . Charlie
withholds the information of the actual order (Πn) to restrict Bob from decoding Alice’s message prior his permission
to do so. Therefore, Bob need not bother about Alice’s choice of merchandise before Charlie informs that payment has
been made by her.
Without the knowledge of the permutation operatorΠn, a potential eavesdropper will also be ignorant about the particle
pairs in the Alice’s and Bob’s strings PA and P
′
B , respectively.
OSB 3: Charlie subsequently prepares 2n decoy qubits as |ψ+〉⊗n and randomly inserts the first (last) n Bell states as decoy
qubits in PA (P
′
B) to yield a larger sequence P
′′
A (P
′′
B) having 2n qubits.
It would be relevant to mention that the choice of Bell states as decoy qubits (i.e., GV subroutine) is not unique here.
The same task can also be achieved using BB84 subroutine2 or using other entangled states. As we are restricting
ourselves to a completely orthogonal state based online shopping scheme we are discussing only random insertion of
Bell pairs in the sequence of message qubits. Finally, Charlie sends P ′′A and P
′′
B to Alice and Bob, respectively.
OSB 4: Charlie discloses the positions of the decoy qubits and partner pairs in Bell states after receiving the authenticated
acknowledgment of the receipt of the qubits from Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob apply GV subroutine to check error
rate and if the computed error rate is found lower than the tolerable error limit, they go to the next step. Otherwise, they
return back to OSB1.
2The BB84 and GV subroutines are shown to be equivalent in the ideal conditions, while over noisy channels this equivalence does not hold anymore [32].
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OSB 5: Alice can now encode her shopping information M by performing suitable Pauli operation. It is predecided that
I, X, iY , and Z Pauli operations will be used to encode 00, 01, 10, and 11, respectively. Subsequently, Alice concate-
nates n decoy qubits (with a prior intention to use GV subroutine for eavesdropping checking) in the message encoded
qubits. Finally, Alice sends the enlarged sequence P ′A to Bob after applying the permutation operatorΠ
′
2n.
Though Bob has now access to both P ′A and P
′
B , he will not be able to find out which particle is entangled with which
particle and decode Alice’s message. Thus, he needs Charlie’s (Alice’s) disclosure of Πn (Π
′
2n) before decoding the
message. Alice’s permutation operation provides security against the Charlie’s aforementioned participant attack [24].
OSB 6: Alice discloses Π′n corresponding to decoy qubits. Alice and Bob perform GV subroutine on the decoy qubits Alice
has inserted. If the errors are below tolerable limit they proceed, otherwise they abort the protocol.
OSB 7: Charlie discloses Πn and Alice announcesΠ
′
n, which allow Bob to decode Alice’s message.
OSB 8: Since the initial Bell states and exact sequence are known, Bob measures the initially entangled partner pairs in the
Bell basis and using the outcomes of his measurement, he decodes the order information sent by Alice.
This quantum online shopping scheme is using the idea of quantum cryptographic switch discussed in Refs. [16, 17, 33].
3.3 Protocol 3: Quantum online shopping using entanglement swapping
We will now introduce an entanglement swapping based quantum online shopping scheme, inspired by the direct secure quan-
tum communication [14] and CDSQC [17] protocols based on entanglement swapping where communication is performed
without actually transmitting the message encoded qubits. Specifically, our entanglement swapping based scheme works as
follows.
ESB 1: Charlie prepares n copies of a three qubit GHZ-like entangled state
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ1〉12|a〉3 ± |ψ2〉12|b〉3) , (1)
where |ψi〉s are the Bell states such that |ψ1〉 6= |ψ2〉, and the single qubit states |a〉 and |b〉 are orthogonal to each other,
i.e., 〈a|b〉 = δa,b. This restriction ensures that qubit 3 remains appropriately entangled with the remaining 2 qubits.
For instance, without loss of generality, we can assume that Charlie prepares |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ+〉12|0〉3 + |ψ−〉12|1〉3) .
ESB 2: Charlie prepares three strings PA1, PA2, and PB of qubits 1, 2, and 3 of all n GHZ-like entangled state, respectively.
He further performs a permutation operatorΠn on PB to obtainP
′
B . This permutation operator ensures Charlie’s control
over the communication between Alice and Bob.
ESB 3: Subsequently, Charlie inserts n decoy qubits randomly in all three strings to obtain enlarged strings P ′A1, P
′
A2, and
P ′′B . The choice of decoy qubits depends upon type of subroutine predecided by the legitimate parties to be performed
for eavesdropping checking. Thereafter, he sends P ′A1 and P
′
A2 (P
′′
B) to Alice (Bob).
ESB 4: Same as OSB 4 but the choice of eavesdropping checking subroutine is arbitrary.
ESB 5: Alice prepares n copies of |ψ+〉A1A2 to encode her secret information of items to be purchased. Specifically, she
applies a Z gate on one of the qubits of the Bell state to encode 1 and does nothing to send 0. Therefore, the composite
state Alice and Bob hold is |ψ′〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ±〉A1A2 |ψ+〉12|0〉3 + |ψ±〉A1A2 |ψ−〉12|1〉3) .
ESB 6: Alice measures qubits A1 and 1 as well as A2 and 2 in Bell basis, while Bob can measure his qubits in the computa-
tional basis. Subsequently, she announces her measurement outcomes, which should reveal her message to Bob.
To understand this point we can write the state before measurement as
|ψ′〉m = 1
2
√
2
({|ψ+〉A11|ψ+〉A22 + |ψ−〉A11|ψ−〉A22 ± |φ+〉A11|φ+〉A22 ± |φ−〉A11|φ−〉A22} |m〉3
+ {|ψ+〉A11|ψ−〉A22 + |ψ−〉A11|ψ+〉A22 ∓ |φ+〉A11|φ−〉A22 ∓ |φ−〉A11|φ+〉A22} |m〉3) ,
(2)
where m corresponds to the message bit encoded by Alice and the upper (lower) sign in the right-hand side of the
equation corresponds to m = 0 (1). Thus, if Alice announces both her measurements resulted in the same (different)
Bell state(s) then Bob’s measurement outcome will be same as (different from) the bit encoded by Alice, i.e.,m (m).
ESB 7: Same as OSB 7.
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Note that the Bell state prepared by Alice to encode her message was measured by her only in ESB 6. Therefore, message
encoded qubits actually do not travel through the channel accessible to Eve at all. This further reduces the number of times
eavesdropping checking is to be performed as the rounds of transmission of qubits is reduced. In view of some of our recent
results [34–37], which show that the performance of a quantum cryptographic scheme (in presence of noise) decays with an
increase in the number of rounds quantum communication is involved, we can predict that this scheme would be relatively
more robust against channel noise.
3.4 Protocol 4: Quantum online shopping using dense coding
The GHZ-like entangled state discussed in the previous protocol can also be used to send message in a secure manner without
relying on entanglement swapping.
DCB 1: Same as ESB 1.
DCB 2: Charlie prepares three strings PA, PB , and PC of qubits 1, 2, and 3 of all GHZ-like entangled states, respectively.
Here, Charlie need not perform a permutation operator as he can also ensure his control over the communication by
keeping the third qubit with himself.
DCB 3: Subsequently, Charlie inserts n decoy qubits randomly in both strings PA and PB to obtain enlarged strings P
′
A and
P ′B , respectively. The choice of decoy qubits depends upon type of subroutine predecided by the legitimate parties to
be performed for eavesdropping checking. Thereafter, he sends P ′A and P
′
B to Alice and Bob, respectively.
DCB 4: Same as ESB 4.
DCB 5: Same as OSB 5, but Bob requires Charlie’s measurement results for the string PC . Also the eavesdropping checking
subroutine is arbitrary.
DCB 6: Same as OSB 6.
DCB 7: Same as OSB 7, while Charlie announces the result of measurement performed on the third qubit in {|a〉, |b〉} basis
instead of the permutation operator.
DCB 8: Same as OSB 8.
So far we have discussed the possibility of performing quantum online shopping task with the help of single photons (in
Protocol 1), Bell states (in Protocol 2), and three-qubit GHZ-like state (in Protocols 3 and 4). However, it is not limited to
this small set of states. There exist several alternative approaches through which efficient online shopping schemes can be
designed using a large class of states. Here, we briefly mention a generalized approach to all these alternative paths.
3.5 Various alternative ways to perform quantum online shopping using multi-qubit entangled
states
The task in hand can be accomplished using other multi-qubit entangled states, too. Specifically, in a densecoding based
direct communication scheme [15, 17, 36], Alice (Bob) possesses p ≤ N
2
(N − p) qubits out of total N qubits of a N -qubit
entangled state (such asW state, GHZ state, GHZ-like state, Q4 state, Q5 state, cluster state, |Ω〉 state, Brown state). Alice
encodes her message using a suitable set of unitary operations and sends the qubits to Bob, who measures all N qubits in the
basis they were prepared.
In the densecoding based online shopping scheme (analogous to Protocol 2), Charlie can randomly prepare one of the
above mentioned multi-qubit states and sends p qubit to Alice while N − p qubits to Bob in a secure manner. He permutes
Bob’s qubits to maintain his control power. Thereafter, Alice and Bob can perform the task under Charlie’s supervision.
Along the line of Protocol 3, a quantum online shopping scheme using entanglement swapping that can transmit an s-bit
message can be designed using the quantum states of the form
|ψ〉 = 1√
2s
2
s∑
i=1
|ei〉|fi〉, (3)
where |ei〉 is an N-qubit maximally entangled state (asW state, GHZ state, GHZ-like state, Q4 state, Q5 state, cluster state,
|Ω〉 state, Brown state). Specifically, {|ei〉} is a basis set with maximally entangled basis vectors in C2N : N ≥ s, while
{|fi〉} is a basis set in C2l : l ≥ s ≥ 1 which may be separable. Thus, |ψ〉 (an N + l qubit entangled state) is prepared
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by Charlie, who shares the string of first N qubits with Alice and that of the last l qubits with Bob in a secure manner. He
had to perform a permutation operator on Bob string to maintain his control over shopping scheme. Thus, Alice can send
her message by preparing extram-qubit entangled state in {|ei〉} basis and measure her qubits in such a way that message is
transmitted through entanglement swapping [14].
A quantum online shopping scheme without entanglement swapping can also be performed using quantum channel of the
form in Eq. (3). Specifically, Charlie keeps the last l qubits with himself and sends p ≤ N
2
(N − p) qubits from the remaining
qubits to Alice (Bob) in a secure manner. Using densecodingAlice encodes her message and sends p qubits in a secure manner
to Bob, who requires Charlie to inform him the measurement outcome of the l qubits to decode Alice’s message. Therefore,
we have discussed a set of possible mechanism to obtain quantum online shopping schemes using a large set of quantum
states.
Once Alice and Bob share an entangled state prepared by Charlie, she can teleport her choice of item to be purchased to
Bob [9]. Analogous to all the schemes discussed so far he will need Charlie’s assistance to reconstruct the details of Alice’s
order.
3.6 Other tasks related to e-commerce
With an escalated interest on quantum internet [38,39] the feasibility of implementation of quantum solutions for e-commerce,
voting [40], sealed-bid auction [41], etc., has also enhanced. Therefore, here we list a set of tasks those can be performed
using modified forms of the proposed schemes. So far we were considering the quantum online shopping where the merchant
delivers the order to buyer once payment has been made and confirmed by his bank. We can consider nowadayswith the advent
of online availability of soft copies of books, magazines, audio, and video which would require a bidirectional communication.
Specifically, a quantum bidirectional online shopping scheme based on controlled quantum dialogue [33,35] can be performed
where Alice sends information of her order to Bob under the supervision of Charlie, while Bob sends some sample files
to Alice. Depending upon the quality of sample file, Alice may choose to cancel her order for which her payment will
be refunded. Protocols described here can be easily modified to design many schemes for secure online computation and
communication. For example, we may think of online examinations (where a central body (Charlie) would authorize an
examiner (Bob) either to evaluated the answer sheet of the candidate Alice or to send him the question paper/evaluated answer
sheet), participation in webinars (where the convener (Charlie) would check whether the participant Alice is authorized (paid
registration fees) to listen the talk of Bob, viewing of a particular channel in the TV set of a particular customer (where the
service provider (Charlie) would check whether the customer Alice is authorized to see the Channel broadcasted by Bob.
Multicontroller versions of all such schemes can also be designed [23]. We are not extending this list here, but numerous such
situations exist where the current protocol or its simple variants will be useful.
4 Security of the proposed protocols
As the set of protocols proposed by us are variants of CDSQC schemes, in analogy of the CLZ [23] or HYJ [24] protocols,
the security of the schemes can be established along the same line. However, the attack designed in Ref. [24] and loophole
pointed out by us here are not applicable on the proposed schemes. In what follows, we can categorize the security against a
set of attacks in the outsider’s and participant’s attacks.
4.1 Security against outsider’s attack
Here, we will establish the security of the proposed schemes against Eve’s individual attacks.
1. Intercept-and-resend attack: Eve may choose to replace the qubits sent by Charlie (or a sender in general) by freshly
prepared qubits and send it to the receiver. Using this attack, Eve would succeed to get Alice’s message if she intercepts
the encoded qubits sent from Alice to Bob exploiting information of the initially prepared state. To circumvent this
attack in Protocol 1, BB84 subroutine is performed for eavesdropping checking. Specifically, when Charlie and Alice
(or Bob) compute error rates using the randomly inserted decoy qubits prepared in two mutually unbiased bases, and
from which they can proceed with (discard) the protocol if the error rate is below (above) threshold. If Eve measures
the intercepted qubits either in the computational or diagonal basis before sending the freshly prepared qubit in the
measurement outcome, she would induce disturbance for the wrong choice of basis. Specifically, for n travel qubits,
eavesdropping checking is performed on n
2
decoy qubits. Suppose Eve measuresm qubits (which will have both decoy
and message qubits). Without loss of generality, we can assume that an equal number of decoy and message qubits are
measured, i.e., m
2
decoy qubits are measured out of the total number of n
2
decoy qubits. As the error rate is calculated
using decoy qubits only, the fraction of the intercepted decoy qubits is f = m/2n/2 =
m
n . Thus, the mutual information
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between the sender (Charlie) and Eve is I(C : E) = f/2 as she (Eve) can choose the correct basis half of the time. In
the rest half of the time, when she chooses the wrong basis, she would prepare states in the wrong basis resulting in the
wrong measurement outcome at the receiver’s end half of the time e = f/2
2
= f
4
. Thus, I(A : B) = (1−H [ f
4
]), where
H [u] is the Shannon binary entropy. A quantum cryptographic scheme works until I(A : B) ≥ I(A : E), which results
in the present case as tolerable attack fraction f ∼= 0.68 and corresponding error rate as 17% ( [36, 37] and references
therein). Note that Eve’s success probability for each attacked qubit is 3
4
, which would become very small for higher
values ofm as it would approach
(
3
4
)m
.
2. Entangle-and-measure attack: Instead of intercepting and measuring the transmitting qubit, Eve may choose to en-
tangle her qubit (initially prepared in α |0〉+ β |1〉) with the travel qubits accessible to her. To obtain the secret she will
measure her ancillae qubits at a later stage. However, during security checking, decoy states randomly prepared in |0〉 ,
|1〉 , |+〉, and |−〉 are measured in the computational and diagonal basis, which would result the wrong result with prob-
ability |β|2 if she attacks |0〉 or |1〉 decoy state, while the states remain separable for the rest of the decoy qubits. Thus,
total probability of detection of Eve in this attack is
|β|2
2
assuming all four decoy states are equally probable [36, 37].
3. Correlation-elicitation attack: In this attack, Eve may exploit availability of some of the qubits of the entangled
quantum channel more than once to extract encoded message [42]. Specifically, Eve can check the parity of Bell states
using two CNOT if both the qubits are accessible to her. In the proposed schemes, use of decoy qubits leaves signature
of eavesdropping to be detected while checking subroutine.
4. Impersonation attack or Man-in-the-middle attack: Eve may try to play as the receiver (sender) to the sender
(receiver). This attack can be prevented by using authentication of the identities of the sender and receiver before
quantum communication [43, 44]. The receiver should further inform the sender about the receipt of the transmitted
qubits over such an authenticated classical channel.
5. Disturbance attack or modification attack: Eve may also attempt some denial of service attacks, where she does not
intend to extract information but to misguide the legitimate parties only. She can disturb the content of the message by
changing the order of qubits or applying random unitary operations on the encoded qubits. Note that this will not reveal
any information to Eve but this attack will also be revealed during eavesdropping checking performed to ensure secure
transmission of the qubits ( [36] and references therein).
A special case which requires attention is the orthogonal state based quantum online shopping scheme which is de-
scribed above as Protocol 2. In Protocol 2, if Eve applies a single qubit operation (say X gate) on all the transmitted
qubits, it will not change the decoy states being two qubit Bell states, while the order information will be changed
completely. Applicability of this attack is not restricted to the Protocol 2 of e-commerce, it’s in fact applicable to many
schemes whose security is ensured by using the GV subroutine. This is not a serious attack as it does not reveal any
information to Eve, but it has a serious impact on e-commerce as it can be used to change the order. Interestingly, it’s
possible to circumvent this attack. To do so, Alice can send some redundant qubits and compare their measurement
outcomes with Bob.
6. Trojan-horse attack: Eve may design attacks based on the implementation of the scheme [45–47]. Though a quantum
cryptographic scheme can not be proved secure against trojan-horse attack using principles of quantum mechanics,
various technical measures have been discussed in the recent past to circumvent these attacks [45–47].
4.2 Security against participant’s attack
A participant attack is more powerful in multiparty quantum communication scheme as a legitimate user has more access to
the useful information than Eve. Therefore, here we analyze the attacking strategy of each participant.
1. Charlie can try to extract the choice of merchandise by Alice as pointed out in Ref. [24], where this attack has been
circumvented by the use of an extra key by Alice. However, here we have discussed that this provide an advantage to
Alice, which would not be present if Alice and Bob share the quantum key used by her using a quantum key distribution
or agreement scheme ( [2, 4, 25] and references therein). Here, we have proposed that Alice applies a permutation
operation on the encoded qubits to defend from this attack.
Charlie can also exploit the fact that he is authorized to prepare the state to be used as quantum channel. As the
proposed schemes would remain secure until the controller prepares the desired state, Alice and Bob can randomly
choose to measure a few copies of such states to check correlations.
2. Alice can try to cheat by changing the item ordered, without being detected, even after payment has been made. We
have pointed the feasibility of this attack in the e-commerce schemes proposed in Refs. [23, 24]. However, the present
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Name of the protocol η ηq
CLZ [23] 1
4
1
3
HYJ [24] 1
5
1
3
Semiquantum online shopping Protocol 1 [25] 1
23
1
21
Semiquantum online shopping Protocol 2 [25] 1
18
1
16
Protocol 1 proposed here 1
5
1
3
Protocol 2 proposed here 2
7
2
5
Protocol 3 proposed here 1
8
1
6
Protocol 4 proposed here 2
9
1
3
Table 1: Comparison of qubit efficiency of the existing and the proposed protocols.
schemes take care of any such attack by either using a key which is already shared between Alice and Bob or by
application of a permutation operation by Alice. In the latter case, if Alice chooses to reveal wrong permutation operator,
the information shared by Charlie regarding the initial state preparation to Bob will fail to extract order details. Thus,
the online shopping task will be aborted and Alice would not gain any advantage.
3. As mentioned in Ref. [23], Bob can try to know the order placed by Alice before Charlie authorizes him to do so.
However, Bob will not be able to decode information regarding Alice’s order without Charlie’s assistance as he will
remain ignorant about the initial state chosen by the supervisor.
5 Qubit efficiency of the protocols
The efficiency of a secure quantum communication scheme can be analyzed using a quantitative measure [48] defined as
η =
c
q + b
, (4)
where c is the number of classical bits transmitted using q number of qubits. In addition, b bits of classical communication is
also required, which does not include that used for eavesdropping checking.
There is one more parameter, often discussed to analyze the performance of a cryptographic scheme, which quantifies
number of bits transmitted per qubit in a scheme. Note that this definition does not take into account the classical communi-
cation required in accomplishing certain task. Thus, we can use another quantitative measure as
ηq =
c
q
. (5)
The comparative study performed here (summarized in Table 1) establishes that the proposed protocols are much efficient
compared to the existing schemes [23–25]. Specifically, the qubit efficiency of the improved HYJ protocol is less than that of
CLZ protocol as an extra n bit classical communication of key by Alice is required in the former protocol. Our Protocol 1,
which uses the same amount of quantum and classical resources as HYJ scheme, is equally efficient to that. The rest of our
protocols use entangled states. Specifically, Protocol 2 uses Bell states and densecoding thus becomes most efficient scheme.
Note that Protocols 3 and 4 use GHZ-like states while difference in qubit efficiency comes from the reason that densecoding
cannot be used in Protocol 3, and Protocol 4 requires n bit classical communication. Thus, Protocol 4 is also more efficient
than previously existing HYJ protocol. Protocol 3 may not appear more efficient but has an intrinsic advantage that message
encoded qubits are never accessible to Eve. This feature is quite consistent with our earlier observation that requirement of
quantum resources increases for sophisticated and complex quantum cryptographic tasks [25, 49]. In fact, one can clearly see
that semiquantum online shopping schemes [25] have very small values of both qubit efficiency and bits transmitted per qubit
used in comparison to the rest of the online scheme in Table 1.
If the number of bits transmitted per qubit used is considered then our Protocols 1 and 4 are equally efficient as CLZ
and HYJ. Protocol 2 (3) is most (least) efficient in the set of quantum online shopping schemes discussed here. We have not
compared the qubit efficiency of the proposed schemes with more recent schemes [26,27] due to use of quantum teleportation
and quantum key distribution in them to ensure the security of the online banking. Also, the semiquantum schemes for any
cryptographic task are also less efficient than corresponding fully quantum schemes [25].
9
6 Conclusions
With advent of quantum technologies and feasibility of quantum internet in the near future, various socio-economic problems
can be addressed using quantum solutions. Along this line quantum schemes for voting, auction and online banking have been
introduced in the recent past. As far as online shopping is concerned, an improvement in the recently proposed single photon
based scheme [23] has been proposed, which restricts the bank from accessing the order placed by the buyer [24]. Here, we
have pointed out a loophole in the improved scheme [24] that the buyer may change the merchandise even after payment for
his order has been made.
We further propose solution to such a participant attack by using a previously shared key instead of random key by the
buyer or a permutation operator. Here, we have given a set of such schemes using different quantum channels based on various
CDSQC schemes. Specifically, a single photon based improved scheme (Protocol 1), a cryptographic switch based scheme
using Bell state (Protocol 2), and two 3-qubit state based schemes using entanglement swapping (Protocol 3) and densecoding
(Protocol 4) are proposed. The entangled state based schemes are further shown generally implementable using a large set
of schemes. Thus, the proposed schemes provide numerous possible ways to experimentally implement the quantum online
shopping scheme.
From the set of proposed quantum online shopping schemes the single photon based proposed by us is as efficient as
previous single photon based scheme [24]. The entanglement based schemes are more efficient than the single photon based
schemes if densecoding is exploited. However, the entanglement swapping based scheme (Protocol 3) proposed by us is
least efficient as densecoding can not be exploited in this case. On the other hand, this less efficient scheme has an intrinsic
advantage as message encoded qubits neither travel from Alice to Bob nor are accessible to Eve. We have established the
security of all the proposed schemes from both individual attacks of an outsider and participant attacks. We have not discussed
the effect of noise as the same on CDSQC has already been reported by us in case of non-Markovian channels, which can
be reduced to the Markovian channel in the limiting case [35]. Further, a clear prescription for the study of the effect noise
is provided in ( [33–35] and references therein) using which single qubit (entangled state) based quantum communication
schemes are shown to perform better in the amplitude and phase damping (collective noise) channels [34]. Following the
same strategy the effect of noise on the proposed protocols can be studied with ease, and we expect Protocol 1 to perform
better than others over the amplitude and phase damping channels, while the other schemes may be preferred when the qubits
are transmitted in the collective noise.
We hope that the proposed alternatives of the quantum online shopping schemes will provide experimentalists numerous
possibilities to realize the task in the near future.
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